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Memoires by eminently creative people often describe architectural spaces and qualities
they believe instrumental for their creativity. However, places designed to encourage
creativity have had mixed results, with some found to decrease creative productivity for
users. This may be due, in part, to lack of suitable empirical theory or model to guide
design strategies. Relationships between creative cognition and features of the physical
environment remain largely uninvestigated in the scientific literature, despite general
agreement among researchers that human cognition is physically and socially situated.
This paper investigates what role architectural settings may play in creative processes by
examining documented first person and biographical accounts of creativity with respect
to three central theories of situated cognition. First, the embodied thesis argues that
cognition encompasses both the mind and the body. Second, the embedded thesis
maintains that people exploit features of the physical and social environment to increase
their cognitive capabilities. Third, the enaction thesis describes cognition as dependent
upon a person’s interactions with the world. Common themes inform three propositions,
illustrated in a new theoretical framework describing relationships between people and
their architectural settings with respect to different cognitive processes of creativity.
The framework is intended as a starting point toward an ecological model of creativity,
which may be used to guide future creative process research and architectural design
strategies to support user creative productivity.
Keywords: creativity, architectural design, embodied cognition, embedded cognition, enactive cognition,
affordance, ecological psychology, niche construction
INTRODUCTION
Stories abound about how creative people feel their physical environments become part of their
creative process. Kipling (1937) described in detail the oﬃce where he wrote and espoused the
importance of his “working tools,” including obsidian black ink and a camel hair brush, as the
“magic” behind his creativity. Marcel Proust wrote from his childhood bed at the Haussmann
Boulevard residence, in a dimly lit room where he lined the walls and ceiling with cork providing
protection from dust that triggered allergies and social intrusions that might distract him from
his work (Fuss, 2004). Immanuel Kant habitually gazed at the Löbenicht church steeple from
the window of his home at 87–88 Prinzessinstraße and, feeling so strongly its importance to
his creative process, insisted his neighbor’s tree be cut down when it grew to obscure his view
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(Wasianski, 1902). Jonas Salk attributed his breakthrough on
the polio vaccine to time spent at a 13th century monastery in
Italy. He later tasked the architect Louis Kahn with capturing
its aesthetic qualities through the iconic design of the Salk
Institute in La Jolla, CA, USA — hoping to similarly inspire
creativity among the scientists working there (Leslie, 2008,
2010). These stories suggest that people’s creative processes
may be intrinsically linked with the settings in which they
work as a form of physically situated cognition, however, the
potential role of the physical environment in creative processes
has received little attention in the empirical literature (Drake,
2003; Dul et al., 2011). Although architects (like Kahn) have
designed places to foster creativity, they do so without an
appropriate theory to inform design strategies. The aim of
this paper is ﬁrst to inform scholarly discourse around the
topic of creative cognition as embodied, embedded, and enacted
in architectural settings and second to provide a theoretical
framework illustrating relationships between people and their
physical environments during creativity, guiding future research,
and architectural design strategies supporting user creative
productivity.
This paper examines ﬁrst person and biographical accounts
of creative practitioners that describe their creative processes,
including what they do and how they work in architectural
settings when solving ill-deﬁned problems. Creative practitioner1
is a term used to include extraordinarily creative people as well as
professionals earning a living through creative work, for example,
artists, writers, composers, choreographers, architects, scientists,
and anyone who has developed suﬃcient domain expertise to be
compensated for developing ideas or products. Domain expertise
is necessary to be creative within a ﬁeld (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996;
Runco, 2007) and the ability to earn a living addresses the varying
years of practice required by diﬀerent disciplines. Creativity
involves stages from problem identiﬁcation through ideation and
implementation of a product (artifact, theory, technique, process,
etc.) that is original and has value or purpose for a segment
of society. Creative processes examined in this paper include
those involved in ideation stages, deﬁned here as generating,
elaborating, and incubating. Finally, architectural settings are
designed environments deﬁned by features and qualities relevant
to building design professionals, such as: (a) building sites and
their connectivity to regional amenities (e.g., walking or bicycle
paths, streets, bus or train stops, etc.); (b) building structures
including materials, spatial layout, and orientation to views or
other site amenities; and (c) rooms and their ﬁnishes, furnishings,
equipment (e.g., lighting), and shared or personal items (e.g.,
tools, materials, and decorative objects).
The argument presented here is theoretically grounded
in empirical knowledge from cognitive science, ecological
psychology, and the creativity and design literatures (including
psychological and neurobiological studies). It is organized as
follows: ﬁrst, a review of creativity research approaches highlights
1Creativity is typically described as extraordinary (deﬁned by ideas that are a
signiﬁcant departure from those in the ﬁeld) or everyday (encompassing ideas that
are original to the person or personswho conceived them (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996).
Places designed to support creativity generally target users whose work is deemed
creative by others, but may not be extraordinary (i.e., creative practitioners).
the gap in the literature as it concerns the physical context
of creativity. Next, theories of embodied, embedded, and
enacted cognition (the 3E’s) are used to examine relationships
between creative cognition and architectural settings. The
3E’s serve to organize ﬁrst person and biographical accounts
of creativity around common physically situated processes.
This organization informs three propositions about person–
environment relationships during creativity. The propositions
are illustrated in a new conceptual framework, integrating
and extending prior theoretical work in enactive cognition by
Varela et al. (1991) and ecological psychology by Gibson (1977).
The framework describes the dynamic relationship between
people and features of their architectural settings during situated
processes of creativity, providing foundational work for an
ecological model aimed at better understanding and predicting
creative behaviors in designed environments.
CONSIDERING THE PHYSICAL
CONTEXT OF CREATIVITY
Scientists acknowledge that creativity is a complex and
multifaceted phenomenon that cannot be fully understood from
the perspective of a singular approach or domain of study (Runco,
2007; Sawyer, 2012), yet the physical context of creativity has
received relatively little attention in the literature (Hunter et al.,
2007; Dul et al., 2011). In fact, much research conducted over
the past century has focused only on certain aspects of creativity
(Fryer, 2012), organized by Rhodes (1961) as the Four Ps:
Person, Product, Process, and Press (environments supporting
creativity). Within the press research strand there have been some
eﬀorts to understand how creative performance results from
interactions between diﬀerent dimensions of creativity, including
social (but not physical) environments2. Process research strands
largely focus on purely mental operations, with consideration
for the socially situated nature of certain creativity stages
reﬂected in some recent models3. Whether creative processes
are also physically situated remains largely uninvestigated, with
the notable exception being Csikszentmihalyi’s (1990, 1996)
ﬂow theory, describing a single creative process. From the
architectural design perspective, there have been a few attempts
to understand impacts of workplace designs on user creative
productivity, however, studies are often limited to participant
perceptions regarding social interactions or aesthetics. There is
little evidence of meaningful integration between creative process
and physical press research strands.
Architectural Design Strategies
Promoting Creativity
Social behaviors are frequently promoted in modern architectural
designs intended to increase creativity. For example, in his
2For example, the Domain-Individual-Field-Interaction (DIFI) model (Feldman
et al., 1994) or Amabile’s (1996) componential model linking person, process and
(social) press.
3For example, Van Gundy (1987), Mumford et al. (1991), Feldman et al. (1994),
and Isaksen et al. (2000) in Table 1.
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design for the Salk Institute, Kahn separated scientists’ oﬃces
(inspired by monastic cells at Assisi) from their laboratories,
providing courtyard gardens between to host impromptu
conversations he envisioned occurring when people walked
between their workspaces (Kahn, 2003, pp. 71, 132–134,
142–145). Oﬃce buildings incorporate strategies to increase
communication and collaboration by encouraging social density
in ‘attractor’ spaces such as workrooms, atriums, and cafés
(Fayard and Weeks, 2007; Yaneva, 2010; Sailer, 2011) and
eschewing private oﬃces in lieu of open oﬃce designs
(Ekvall and Tångeberg-Andersson, 1986; Vithayathawornwong
et al., 2003; McCoy, 2005). Research examining eﬀects of
these strategies is minimal and results contradictory (McCoy,
2005; Fayard and Weeks, 2007). Some studies ﬁnd better
information and idea exchange in private oﬃces than multi-
purpose rooms, cafés, meeting rooms (Grajewski, 1993), or
open oﬃces (Hatch, 1987; Vithayathawornwong et al., 2003)
and others discover increased quantity and frequency of social
interaction in open oﬃces, but higher quality of communication
(Ekvall and Tångeberg-Andersson, 1986) and greater creativity
(Sailer, 2011) in private oﬃces. There is no clear evidence of
how spatial conﬁgurations might support creativity. Further,
studies do not consider the full range of creative behaviors
involved in diﬀerent stages of creativity, focusing only on
communication and social interactions as predictors of creative
productivity.
Aesthetic qualities people believe inspire their creativity are
a frequent subject in ﬁrst person accounts, and studies show
those environments people perceive as inspirational generally
do increase their creative productivity (McCoy and Evans,
2002; Dul and Ceylan, 2011; Dul et al., 2011). However,
identiﬁcation of speciﬁc architectural features or attributes
remains elusive. Scientists have examined people’s preferences
for diﬀerent design features in meeting rooms (Ceylan et al.,
2008; de Korte et al., 2011) libraries, oﬃces, living rooms,
hallways, dining facilities, sports facilities, and retail stores
(McCoy and Evans, 2002). Findings suggest people prefer
rooms with natural lighting and views of nature (McCoy and
Evans, 2002; Ceylan et al., 2008), but color and material
choices are unclear; people preferred warm colors and materials
high in visual complexity in one study (McCoy and Evans,
2002) but cool colors and low visual complexity in another
(Ceylan et al., 2008). Hypothesizing that spatial arousal eﬀects
impact creative ideation, de Korte et al. (2011) found although
red rooms are more arousing than blue and green rooms
(as measured by heart rate variability), room color did not
signiﬁcantly impact ideation ﬂuency. Mehta et al. (2012)
ﬁnd ideational ﬂuency and originality improves in conditions
with moderate background noise (such as found in a café),
however, eﬀects are not likely due to spatial arousal as ﬁrst
hypothesized, but processing disﬂuency (low level distraction)
which increases abstraction, reduces conﬁrmation bias, and
consequently improves ideation. Anecdotes describe diﬀerent
types of places as creativity unfolds; yet impacts of spatial
qualities on behavior and cognitive processes during diﬀerent
stages of creativity (from problem ﬁnding through product
implementation) remain largely uninvestigated.
Process Models and Their Limitations for
Informing Architectural Designs
Scientiﬁc understanding of creative processes has largely been
informed by studying what eminently creative people do (or
say they do)4 (Sternberg, 1999). Wallas (1926) developed one of
the earliest and most enduring stage models from ﬁrst-person
accounts of creativity — a speech by German physicist Hermann
von Helmholtz (pp. 79–80) and a book chapter written by the
French mathematician Jules Henri Poincaré (p. 75). His model
describes creativity as conscious (explicit) and subconscious
(intuitive) mental processes involving stages of: (1) preparation,
where knowledge is acquired; (2) incubation, a period of rest
when knowledge is subconsciously restructured; (3) illumination,
a moment of insight; and (4) veriﬁcation, when an idea is
evaluated and possibly applied. The Wallas model continues
to be extensively referenced5 in the creativity literature despite
criticisms it (a) neglects to identify all sub-processes of creativity
and (b) does not adequately explain relationships between stages
including how people sequence between them (Lubart, 2001;
Fryer, 2012). This paper argues another limitation is it reduces
creativity to mental operations, giving little consideration for
physically situated processes.
Many researchers have developed their own process models
attempting to address limitations of the Wallas model, including
those cited in Table 1. Some identify additional sub-processes
of creativity by dividing Wallas’s preparation (Osborn, 1953;
Sternberg et al., 2002) or veriﬁcation stages (Feldman et al.,
1994; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Sternberg et al., 2002). Others
propose entirely new stages, such as Evans and Russell’s (1989)
frustration stage or Sternberg’s (2006) redeﬁne problems (ﬁrst)
and sell idea (last) stages. Many models reﬂect a shift in thinking
about creativity from purely individual to a socio-cultural
process, incorporating social activities such as brainstorming
(Osborn, 1953) for ideation and feedback from critique or use
during implementation (Van Gundy, 1987; Mumford et al.,
1991; Feldman et al., 1994; Isaksen et al., 2000). This social
aspect of creativity is often reﬂected in modern workplace
designs; however, when and how during the creative process social
interactions improve (or inhibit) creativity remains unclear. For
example, studies ﬁnd brainstorming groups are less eﬀective
at generating ideas than the same number of people working
alone (Diehl and Stroebe, 1987; Diehl and Stroebe, 1991;
Mullen et al., 1991; Kohn and Smith, 2011), however, many
people attribute social interaction to breakthrough on a creative
problem (Johnson, 2010). Modern workplace designs are largely
based in trends emphasizing ‘attractor’ spaces to provoke
social interactions, with little understanding about how social
interactions engender, support, or inhibit diﬀerent creative
processes, or sequences of processes — nor do they measure
impacts these spaces have on innovation and organizational
performance” (Waber et al., 2014).
4Eminently creative people are frequent subjects of empirical investigation, but
creativity is understood to involve ordinary cognitive processes (Ward and
Kolomyts, 2010).
5For example, a version of the Wallas model is incorporated in Amabile’s
componential model and the DIFI model.
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TABLE 1 | Creative stage models compared.
Modes of creative thinking
Model Author(s) Problem-finding/
Problem-framing
Ideation Implementation/
Feedback from use
Generating Incubating Elaborating
Wallas, 1926 Preparation Incubation, Illumination Verification
Rossman, 1931 Observation, Analysis,
Survey
Formulation, Critique,
Invention
Experimentation,
Selection, Perfection
Osborn, 1953 Orientation, Preparation,
Analysis
Hypothesis Incubation Synthesis, Verification
Gordon, 1961 Groundwork Immersion, Divergent
Exploration
Selection, Articulation,
Transformation
Implementation
Bransford and Stein, 1984 Identify Problem, Define
Goals
Explore Approaches Act on Plan Look at Effects
Van Gundy, 1987 Objective Finding, Fact
Finding, Problem Finding
Idea Finding Solution Finding Acceptance Finding
Barron, 1988 Conception Gestation, Pasturation Bringing Up Baby
Evans and Russell, 1989 Preparation, Frustration Incubation, Insight Evaluation, Elaboration
Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, 1996 Flow
Mumford et al., 1991 Problem Construction,
Knowledge Acquisition,
Concept Selection
Novel Combination,
Ideation
Evaluation Implementation and
Feedback
Finke et al., 1992 Generative Exploratory
Feldman et al., 1994 Internalize Domain Generate Novelty Externalize Ideas Submit to Field,
Evaluate, Disseminate
Isaksen et al., 2000 Frame Problems, Explore
Data, Construct
Opportunities
Generate Ideas Develop Solutions Build Acceptance
Process models are explanatory, describing sequential stages
of creativity; although they often inform creativity training
approaches, they have not had much predictive power (Runco,
2007; Sawyer, 2012). The creative process is understood to be
iterative, suggesting people move through stages multiple times,
possibly out of sequence (Armbruster, 1989; Csikszentmihalyi,
1996), and as they deem appropriate (Lubart, 2001). There are
few models that consider relationships between stages. Evans
and Russell (1989) suggest during the preparation stage the
mind eventually reaches a limit to the amount of information
it can absorb, leading to a frustration stage, which then incites
an incubation stage. Finke’s (1997) Genoplore model describes
complementary generative and exploratory processes during
ideation. People generate initial ideas, which he describes as
incomplete plans, and test these through exploratory actions.
Outcomes of exploration are used to develop the idea, generating
new exploratory actions, and so forth, until the creative product
emerges from the process. Csikszentmihalyi’s (1990, 1996) ﬂow
theory describes complementary processes of thinking and acting
when people feel immersed in a creative experience and at
their most productive. During ﬂow, people maintain undivided
attention to the task at hand, externalize a creative idea through
making, perceive immediate feedback from their exploratory
actions or strategies, and have a sense of personal enjoyment
while engaged in the experience (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996, pp 110–
113). Flow is described as a mental state of creativity, but is
engendered through physically situated activities and sustained
by speciﬁc environmental conditions. Flow requires signiﬁcant
mental eﬀort; people rely on familiar tools and materials to
sustain attention and prefer comfortable settings to help them
focus (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996, p. 120). As a mode of physically
situated cognition, ﬂow may begin to provide insight into why
creative people attribute importance to particular settings or
features of their physical environment. Flow theory does not
account for other stages (or modes of situated cognition) that
occur throughout the creative process.
Popularity of the Wallas model persists, researchers suggest,
because it (a) describes what eminently creative people have
written about their creative process, (b) it resonates with what
people feel they do when they are creative, and, (c) although
researchers have sought to address its limitations, they have yet to
provide a better model (Armbruster, 1989; Fryer, 2012). Because
it was developed over a century ago, it does not reﬂect new
knowledge from brain sciences, including how people leverage
social and physical resources in their environments to improve
cognition. As a starting point toward better understanding the
physically situated processes of creativity, Table 1 organizes
commonly cited stage models, and Csikszentmihalyi’s physically
situated process of creative ﬂow, around common modes of
creative thinking they describe. This organization guides analysis
of ﬁrst person and autobiographical accounts of creativity for
evidence of physically situated processes. Modes are organized as
follows. Problem-ﬁnding categorizes all stages prior to novel idea
ideation, including problem deﬁnition/framing and knowledge
acquisition (e.g., the Wallas preparation stage). Ideation includes
generating stages describing processes for coming up with new
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FIGURE 1 | Situated cognition and the three E’s.
ideas, incubating stages involving subconscious processes when
people are not explicitly working on a problem, and elaborating,
characterized by stages of veriﬁcation, articulation, selection, and
reﬁnement. Implementation involves stages when a creative idea
is tested and evaluated in a socio-cultural context. This paper
focuses on the three modes of ideation.
The following section considers how creativity may
be physically situated; documented accounts by creative
practitioners are organized by mode of creative ideation they
describe and examined with respect to the situated cognition
theories of embodied, embedded, and enactive cognition. The
intention behind this eﬀort is to better understand if/how
features and qualities of the physical environment constrain
and/or enable creative ideation.
PHYSICALLY SITUATING CREATIVITY
WITH THE 3E’s
Environmental structure is now understood to be critical to
human cognition6 (Thagard, 2005; Leidlmair, 2009; Robbins and
6A growing number of researchers challenge cognitivist categorical structural (i.e.,
people create mental models of the world fromwhich they plan and problem-solve)
Aydede, 2009) and situated cognition theory describes knowledge
as “inextricably situated in the physical and social context of its
acquisition and use” (Brown, 2001, p. 65). Three central ideas7 in
situated cognition (the 3E’s) consider how cognition is physically
situated: (1) the embodied thesis – that cognition encompasses
both the mind and the body (Varela et al., 1991; Lakoﬀ and
Johnson, 1999; Gallagher, 2005); (2) the embedded thesis – that
people exploit features of the physical and social environment
to increase cognitive capabilities; (Kirsh and Maglio, 1994; Clark,
2008a), and (3) the enactive thesis— that cognition is constituted
through a person’s actions in the world. Enactive cognition
is generally treated as a theory separate from embodied and
embedded cognition, however, Ward and Stapleton (2012) argue
if cognition is enactive it is also embodied and embedded.
Enactive cognition serves here as an overarching theory, focusing
attention on the importance of action in ways people implicitly
understand how settings provide resources for thinking-in-
action. Figure 1 deﬁnes and describes relationships between the
3E’s to guide analysis of ﬁrst person and biographical accounts
and centralized processing perspective (i.e., ﬁrst people perceive, then they think,
and ﬁnally they act; Thagard, 2005).
7The extended mind thesis is often included as a fourth “E,” but not part of this
analysis.
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for evidence of physically situated cognition. In the next section
the 3E’s are discussed separately, focusing attention on common
themes describing person–environment relationships during
diﬀerent modes of creativity. Later in the paper, ﬁndings are
summarized in a table which associates 3E theories with modes
of creative cognition, illustrating how embodied, embedded, and
enactive processes are integrated within the modes.
Embodied Experiences in, Between, and
with Architectural Settings
The embodied thesis maintains cognition depends upon physical
characteristics of the body (Wilson, 2002); its sensory and motor
capabilities shape the mind (Robbins and Aydede, 2009). The
thesis has philosophical roots in existential phenomenology
works of Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Martin
Heidegger who, among others, believed the body is central
to perception and experience (Varela et al., 1991; Gallagher,
2009; Pallasmaa, 2010). With their book The Embodied Mind,
Varela et al. (1991) proposed a phenomenological study of
cognition considering physical characteristics and abilities of the
body in determining how and what sensorimotor knowledge
people are able to construct through interactions in their
environments. Inﬂuences of phenomenology and embodiment
are found today in architectural designs by Zumthor (Mallgrave,
2013), Holl, and Pallasmaa (Holl et al., 2006), with Pallasmaa
largely responsible for bringing awareness of embodied cognition
to architectural design (Mallgrave, 2011) by advocating for multi-
sensory environments engaging hearing, smell, and touch as
antidote to the visual bias in architecture, which he believes yields
“impoverished environments” causing feelings of detachment
and alienation in users (Pallasmaa, 2005).
Another historical inﬂuence for the embodiment thesis
is Gibson’s (1977) work in ecological psychology, including
his theory of aﬀordances. Gibson believed people understand
the world in terms of functional relevance and possibilities
for action (aﬀordances). Although Gibson (1976, p. 413)
proposed that his ecological thesis could provide a much-needed
foundation for architecture, aﬀordance theory has been more
inﬂuential in product design.8 Gibson deﬁnes aﬀordance as a
relationship between person and environment, dependent upon
the person’s intentions and physical abilities with respect to action
opportunities provided by features of the environment (Figure 2).
From his perspective, knowledge is constructed through goal-
directed exploratory actions. The “bottom-up” approach to
8Norman popularized the term in his book “The Design of Everyday Things”
(Norman, 1998). Gibson considered aﬀordances all actionable properties of the
physical environment, whereas Norman’s deﬁned them as perceived actionable
properties.
cognition he describes is reﬂected in Brooks’s (1991a,b) seminal
artiﬁcial intelligence research and Clark’s (2001) concept of
“intelligence without [mental] representation,” arguing minds
are not for thinking but for doing. Some in the architectural
design community champion aﬀordance theory to better predict
behavioral outcomes of designed spaces (Maier et al., 2009;
Lang and Moleski, 2010), however, there is little evidence of its
eﬀectiveness in practice.
A key diﬀerence between the philosophical and ecological
approaches to embodiment in architectural design is the
concept of user agency. The philosophical perspective is more
concerned with how the body constrains cognition (Borghi and
Cimatti, 2010), emphasizing ways spatial features and attributes
aﬀect user (subjective) experiences. In architecture the user
is viewed as a passive recipient of design interventions. The
ecological perspective considers the role the body plays in
constituting cognition (Reed, 1996) suggesting people actively
exploit features and attributes of architectural settings as part
of their cognitive system, taking ownership of their experiences
in their settings. The ecological perspective is most clearly
evident in creativity narratives, including those of Kipling, Kant,
and Proust mentioned in the introduction to this paper. Two
overarching themes of the ecological approach emerge from
personal accounts of creativity: ﬁrst, people use artifacts in their
environment (e.g., tools and materials) as transparent equipment
shaping perceptions during intuitive ideation, and second, people
personalize their settings to help initiate and sustain creative ﬂow
by incorporating them into ritual and sense of creative self.
Thinking-in-Action: Seeing Through Tools and
Materials
People feel tools and materials used during creative ideation
become an extension of themselves, serving to organize creative
experiences (Sennett, 2008; Pallasmaa, 2010). Accounts by
creative practitioners suggest artifacts in their environment are
embodied when they (a) are customary and familiar, (b) facilitate
thinking-in-action (such as through writing, drawing, and model
making), and (c) deepen immersion in the creative process by
enabling immediate feedback from exploratory actions, shaping
experiences in a creative situation.
Personal narratives describe strong feelings for tools and
materials9 with some seeming almost superstitious about roles
they play in creative performance. Kipling (1937) describes how
his creative “Daemon” responds to particular writing instruments
9For other examples, artist interviews (Fig, 2009) or Csikszentmihalyi (1996,
p. 119) quoting Barry Commoner describing how his favorite fountain pen allows
his ideas to ﬂow, whereas a ballpoint pen does not oﬀer the same experience.
FIGURE 2 | Affordance according to Gibson (1977), is a transactional relationship between animal (e.g., person) and environment.
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and materials, expressing distress when the nib of a favored pen
failed him during “an evil hour.”
And with what tools did I work in my own mold-loft?. . .I used
a slim, octagonal-sided, agate penholder with a Waverley nib. It
was a gift, and when in an evil hour it snapped I was much
disturbed. . .For my ink I demanded the blackest. . .All blue-blacks’
were an abomination to my Daemon. . .My writing-blocks were
built for me to an unchanged pattern of large, oﬀ-white, blue
sheets. . .With a lead pencil I ceased to express— probably because I
had to use a pencil in reporting. — Kipling (1937)
We surmise from his writing that Kipling (1937) has come
to favor certain tools and materials; he uses them regularly
(they are customary), and expertly (they are familiar) so
they do not distract from his writing. A favorite pen has a
tight relationship with the way he thinks creatively; he sees
through the tool to the creative situation. When such a tool
fails to perform as expected, his creative process is negatively
impacted, the tool no longer transparently part of his thinking.
Instead it becomes a distraction, a source of distress. Creative
practitioners describe intuitively thinking-in-action when tools
and materials are ﬂuidly incorporated into their idea-generating
processes through activities like sketching, drawing, writing,
and model making. Externalizing an idea allows people to
perceive “feedback” from the situation, identifying unanticipated
opportunities in a creative situation and initiating new actions
in response to them (Schön, 1983, pp 163–164). Aalto (1997,
p. 108) describes his process of intuitively sketching to reconcile
the complex and contradictory requirements of an architectural
design:
“I forget the whole maze of problems for a while, as soon as the feel
of the assignment and the innumerable demands it involves have
sunk into my subconscious. I then move on to a method of working
that is very much like abstract art. I simply draw by instinct,
not architectural synthesis, but what are sometimes quite childlike
compositions, and in this way, on an abstract basis, the main idea
generally takes shape, a kind of universal substance that helps me to
bring the numerous contradictory components into harmony.”
Sketching is used to (1) “handle diﬀerent levels of abstraction
simultaneously,” (2) “enable identiﬁcation and recall of relevant
knowledge,” (3) “assist problem structuring through solution
attempts,” and (4) “promote the recognition of emergent
features and properties” of the design idea (Cross, 2006, p. 37).
Studies have shown the tight relationship between thinking
and acting with tools — demonstrating activation of motor
processes in the brain when people think about using tools,
say words associated with tool use, or watch someone else use
a tool during experimental tasks (Pulvermüller et al., 2005;
Mahon and Caramazza, 2008). Intuitive process of thinking-
in-action is described in Csikszentmihalyi’s (1990, 1996) ﬂow
theory, with understanding gained through unselfconscious
participation and direct experience in a creative situation.
The improvisational jazz performer anticipating each new note
as he hears the last one played (Schön, 1983, pp 55–56),
the painter responding to the texture of the paint and the
colors of pigment on a canvas as she positions the brush
to make the next stroke (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996, p. 208),
and the scientist working through the structure of DNA by
manipulating and reconﬁguring a physical model of machined
parts (Watson, 1968, pp 193–197) are examples of ﬂow. In these
cases there is ﬂuid intertwining of action and perception, and
understanding comes from ﬁrst-hand experience in a physical
context.
The ability to immediately perceive feedback from exploratory
actions deepens feelings of immersion in the creative situation,
blurring the boundary between creator and creation. Berger
(2005, p. 3) describes how he becomes more and more immersed
in the creative process through drawing until he feels he and the
product of his creation have merged.
Each conﬁrmation or denial brings you closer to the object, until
ﬁnally you are, as it were, inside it: the contours you have drawn no
longer marking the edge of what you have seen, but the edge of what
you have become.
Each new action is a response to the current set of
circumstances; ensuing immersion in the process characterized
as activity involving “continual reciprocal causation” (Clark,
2008b, p. 24) when Berger (2005) is simultaneously aﬀecting his
situation and being aﬀected by it. Clark (2008b, p. 25) describes
a famous exchange between physicist Richard Feynman and
historian Charles Weiner to illustrate this principle. Feynman
argues with Weiner that a paper he wrote is not a record
of his thinking, but actually is his thinking. Feynman’s use of
pen and paper is “responsible for the shape of the ﬂow of
thoughts and ideas.” Jung (1952, p. 230) eloquently describes a
similar relationship between Goethe and his writing as follows:
“The work in process becomes the poet’s fate and determines
his psychic development. It is not Goethe who creates Faust,
but Faust which creates Goethe.”. In these cases sense of
creative self extends beyond the body to materials of creative
ideation.
Theme 1: Tools and materials are ‘transparent equipment’
when people see through them to the task at hand, extending
sense of the body during intuitive immersion in ideation
activities.
Widely accepted is that that body schema, somatosensory
representation of the body, changes with tool use (Cardinali
et al., 2009). Extended capabilities aﬀorded by a tool are reﬂected
in neural networks in the brain as corporeal awareness of
the body changes (Maravita and Iriki, 2004). Body schema
is highly plastic, rapidly adapting to new tool use (Carlson
et al., 2010) and can persist for years, such as the case with
phantom limb syndrome or prosthetic device usage (Mayer et al.,
2008). Gallagher (2005) distinguishes between body image (a
conscious sense of ownership) and body schema (an intuitive
sense of sensorimotor capabilities involved in interacting with
the environment). When a tool becomes part of the body
schema, it acts as transparent equipment —the user sees through
the tool to the task at hand (Clark, 2008b, p. 10) and when
this tool is misplaced or fails to perform (such as when
Kipling’s Waverly nib snapped,) a person may feel temporarily
handicapped (e.g., “much disturbed”) over perceived loss of
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creative capabilities. (Is a painter still a painter if you take away
his brush?)
Sense-Giving Spaces for Initiating and Sustaining
Creative Flow
Creative people are often as particular about their working
spaces as they are with their tools. They personalize workspaces,
populating them with meaningful objects or orienting furniture
to favored views, to help them get into a creative mindset,
incorporating environmental features and artifacts into
rituals and sense of creative self. The role of inspirational
objects in ritualistic creative behaviors is the subject of
many narratives (Fig, 2009). Kipling (1937) wrote an entire
chapter devoted to the signiﬁcance of his “working tools.” His
tools included meaningful objects from travels kept on his
desk he felt were instrumental to his creativity. He explains
how these items are essential for inﬂuencing his creative
thoughts.
. . . I always kept certain gadgets on my work-table, which was ten
feet long from North to South and badly congested. One was a long,
lacquer, canoe-shaped pen-tray full of brushes and dead ‘fountains’;
a wooden box held clips and bands; another, a tin one, pins; yet
another, a bottle-slider, kept all manner of unneeded essentials
from emery-paper to small screwdrivers; a paper-weight, said to
have been Warren Hastings’ a tiny, weighted fur-seal and a leather
crocodile sat on some of the papers; an inky foot-rule and a Father of
Penwipers which a much-loved housemaid of ours presented yearly,
made up the main-guard of these little fetishes. . .. Left and right
of the table were two big globes, on one of which a great airman
had once outlined in white paint those air-routes to the East and
Australia which were well in use before my death — Kipling (1937)
Creative practitioners often develop routines to begin creative
processes, such as cleaning up work surfaces or setting out
favorite tools or meaningful artifacts (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996,
pp 351–358; Fig, 2009). When productivity lags they change
routines, alter features of their workspace, or move to a new
setting (Fig, 2009). Although the white, empty art studio may
be a ﬁgural representation of a creative space as a ‘blank
slate’ where anything might happen, in reality the places artists
work are often sensory-rich and full of tools, materials, and
other inspirational objects (Fig, 2009). Aspects of architectural
settings — inspirational objects, room conﬁgurations, and
views — may play an important role as stimulus to beginning
creative ideation. The sustained and focused attention required
for ﬂow takes signiﬁcant eﬀort (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, pp
30–33, 54); people often feel that they need to overcome
psychological barriers to begin the process (Csikszentmihalyi,
1996, pp 344–346).
Environmental features become part of the creative
practitioner’s cognitive system during ideation when they
function without distracting attention from the creative task. In
this respect, qualities of the environment may fall underMurray’s
(1938) deﬁnition of alpha press, when people perceive more
than they attend to (Noë, 2004). Through habitual incorporation
of speciﬁc environmental features and qualities into creative
processes, people feel they become an integral part of their
creative self. The tower view from his writing table seems to
have served this purpose for Kant, as he purportedly became
distraught when his neighbor’s tree obscured his view, insisting
it be cut down (Wasianski, 1902). For Proust, who suﬀered from
allergies and asthma, his cork-lined room initially provided ideal
conditions for health and privacy, but eventually the womb-like
space devoid of sensory stimulation became an essential part of
his twelve-year eﬀort writing about time and space (Fuss, 2004).
In cases like these, spatial features and qualities of settings appear
integral to creative processes, inﬂuencing ideation and sense of
self.
Theme 2: People incorporate features and sensory attributes
of settings into ritualistic behaviors to psychologically
prepare for creative eﬀorts, integrating them into concept
of creative self over time.
The philosophical perspective of embodied cognition is
supported when settings function as transparent equipment,
part of a body’s sense-making process during creativity.
Whether ambient sounds, motions, or inspirational views
are truly embodied, to the extent they are incorporated into
the body schema, cannot be determined from anecdotal
description — although people feel they are. In personalizing
their settings, people create their cognitive niche for creativity.
Through “cognitive niche construction. . .[people] build
physical structures that transform problem spaces in ways
that aid thinking and reasoning” (Clark, 2008b, p. 62).
Features and attributes of workplaces become resources in
the cognitive niche improving creative abilities, whether or
not they are incorporated into body schema. The concept
of niche construction, however, ﬁts more closely with the
embedded thesis when people manipulate features and
attributes of the environment in order to extend creative
capabilities.
Architectural Settings as Scaffolding for
Embedded Cognition
Embodied and embedded cognition often go hand-in-hand and
are sometimes referred to collectively as embodied, embedded
cognition (Clark, 2008a). Where embodied cognition considers
how people use their bodies to help them think, embedded
cognition theory considers how people use features of their
environment to improve their cognitive abilities (Robbins and
Aydede, 2009), including how they oﬀ-load cognitive work to
their environments (Clark, 2001). Clark (2001, p. 46) refers to
this as the “007 Principle” meaning “know only as much as you
need to know to get the job done”. People will not store or process
information they can easily oﬀ-load to the environment, a process
of cognitive bootstrapping (Clark, 2008b). Stories describe how
people exploit aspects of their environments as things to think
with, helping them better understand, evaluate, and elaborate
on ideas. They employ strategies of (a) seeing with diﬀerent
tools and materials to perceive hidden aﬀordances in a situation
through abstraction, (b) seeing as objects and qualities of their
settings to redeﬁne or reframe a problem or idea, and (c) seeking
out new environments with diﬀerent resources to feed their
creativity.
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Things to Think With: Seeing With and Seeing As
People use resources in their environments as cognitive strategies
to simplify the complexity of creative problems through
abstraction with diﬀerent materials, or externalizing ideas in
diﬀerent ways, by seeing with a variety of tools and materials
or to identify new opportunities in a situation or by seeing as
another situation (e.g., using precedents or analogy), helping
to reframe an idea or problem. Reﬂecting on discovery of the
structure of DNA with Watson (1968), Crick (1990) describes
two essential factors for creative success — the ability to ﬁnd
(or deﬁne) an interesting problem and perseverance and skills
required to consider it from multiple perspectives, using all
available resources.
The major credit I think Jim and I deserve. . . is for selecting the
right problem and sticking to it. . .. Both of us had decided, quite
independently of each other, that the central problem in molecular
biology was the chemical structure of the gene. . .. We could not see
what the answer was, but we considered it so important that we
were determined to think about it long and hard, from any relevant
point of view. — Crick (1990, pp 74–75)
In their respective autobiographies, Watson (1968) and Crick
(1990) describe myriad of diﬀerent resources and perspectives
they used in their work, including diagramming, writing,
conversations with other scientists, and, most importantly,
physical model building. It was through iterative manipulation
of three-dimensional materials that they ﬁnally discovered
the structure of DNA. Just as tools organize the creative
imagination, so too are materials and methods used to simplify,
externalize, and evaluate a creative idea when people ‘see
with’ them to uncover previously unperceived opportunities
or constraints in a situation. Diagrams are a visual method
of abstracting and compressing information (Garcia, 2010,
p. 18) used to understand or analyze relationships (e.g.,
temporal, spatial, or organizational) or generate form through
conceptual representation (Allen and Agrest, 2009, pp 41–69;
Eisenman, 2010). Diagrams generally focus more on describing
structural relationships than meaning making (Allen and Agrest,
2009, p. 50), yet their abstracted nature may facilitate deeper
understanding about a creative problem or idea through
analogy and conceptual combinations (Kazmierczak, 2003).
In architecture and engineering diﬀerent types of drawings
(plans, sections, elevations, perspectives) isolate select spatial
relationships for examination (Allen and Agrest, 2009, pp
3–40; Evans, 2000). Models are used in many disciplines,
including mathematics and science, to help people better
understand three-dimensional relationships. Model making
was instrumental in helping Watson (1968, pp 193–197)
and Crick (1990) work through the structure of DNA as
they manipulated and reconﬁgured various machined parts.
Diagrams, drawings, and models facilitate epistemic actions,
deﬁned by Kirsh and Maglio (1994, p. 513) as “actions
performed to uncover information that is hidden or hard to
compute mentally.” When problems are particularly challenging,
epistemic actions aid in the understanding of a problem,
with incremental insights gleaned through feedback from
environmental conditions.
People employ a method of seeing-as to focus on particular
aspects of the creative situation, ﬁltering out any detail that may
obscure or confuse their ability to perceive aﬀordances in the
situation by seeing one case as another previously experienced
case (i.e., precedents), or by comparing experiences in one
situation with their experiences in a diﬀerent, unrelated situation
(i.e., analogy). Analogy is a frequently described cognitive
process of creativity that involves transferring the cognitive
structure from one context where it is well established to a
new context where it had never been used. Dunbar (1995)
describes three types of analogical thinking: selective comparison,
local analogy, and regional analogy. These processes diﬀer
in the domain distance between the two contexts. Selective
comparison uses diﬀerent cognitive structures from within the
same domain. Local analogy involves application of a cognitive
structure from one domain to a related domain. Regional analogy
involves transferring the cognitive structure between completely
dissimilar domains.
Many acts of extraordinary creativity involve regional analogy
and people often describe using aspects of their physical
environments to help themmake conceptual leaps. Le Corbusier’s
design for the roof of Notre Dame du Haut was inspired
by a crab shell he had picked up on the beach and noticed
laying on his drawing board next to the building sketches
(Groat and Wang, 2002, p. 102). The architect John Utzon
used experiences in his environment to help him think about
his design for the Sydney Opera House (Peltason and Ong-
Yan, 2010, pp 91–97). He watched large ships being built with
ribs in the shipyard outside his oﬃce building. He considered
how the fruit of an orange is organized in sections. He
imagined how space inside a building was like music. All of this
information acquired from the environment changed the way
he approached the design for the iconic building and inﬂuenced
its form, organization, and structure. Philo Farnsworth was
plowing a ﬁeld when he came up with the idea to project
moving images line-by-line — which led to the invention of the
television (Thomas, 2004). George de Mestral found inspiration
for Velcro as he picked burrs oﬀ of his dog after a walk in
the woods (Hargroves and Smith, 2006). Creative practitioners
seem particularly skillful at exploiting environmental resources
to help them consider creative problems and ideas from many
diﬀerent perspectives, often leading to leaps in insight as they
solve complex problems.
Theme 3: People use methods of seeing with tools and
materials and seeing as objects and features of their
environment to understand complex problems and creative
situations in new ways.
Creative practitioners shape their own creative situations by
acting in and on their environments, but the situations they
create, in turn, inﬂuence their experiences and aﬀordances they
are able to perceive. Some stories suggest they are attuned to
search their environment for potentially relevant information,
even when not explicitly working on a problem — for example,
Farnsworth’s ability to perceive aﬀordances in the way he plowed
a ﬁeld for his pioneering work in television or de Mestral’s idea
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for Velcro from the hooked structure of a plant he pulled oﬀ
his pet.
Serendipity Favors the Embedded Mind
People are active agents, explorers of their environment who
habitually scan the world for information that is relevant to
them (Reed, 1996, pp 18–19). For the creative practitioner, the
world is an endless supply of resources for creativity. In her
autobiography, choreographer Twyla Tharp describes how she
perceives her environment in terms of the aﬀordances it provides
to think in new ways about her choreography.
Everything that happens in my day is transactional between the
external world and my internal world. Everything is raw material.
Everything is relevant. Everything is usable. Everything feeds my
creativity. But without proper preparation, I cannot see it, retain
it, use it (Tharp and Reiter, 2003, p. 10).
By “proper preparation,” she likely refers to the necessary skills
and expertise required for creativity within her domain. However,
preparation also describes her mindset; the environmental
scanning she conducts is goal-directed, focused by interest and
concern for dance.
Anecdotes describe how people develop a breakthrough idea
through what seems sheer good luck. These stories feed myths
of creativity as divine inspiration: Archimedes in the bath as
he solves a method for measuring the volume of irregular
objects; Newton’s observation of a falling apple as inspiration
for his universal theory of gravity (Epstein, 1979), and Flemings
discovery of penicillin in a moldy petri dish (Bennett and Chung,
2001, p. 168), to name a few. Feynman recounts the fortunate day
he was in a cafeteria when someone threw a plate in the air; he
credits this serendipitous event as inciting a process that led to
the Nobel Prize (Feynman and Leighton, 1997, pp 171–174).
. . .So I got this new attitude. . . I’m going to play with physics . . .
Within a week I was in the cafeteria and some guy, fooling around,
throws a plate in the air. As the plate went up in the air I saw it
wobble, and I noticed the redmedallion of Cornell on the plate going
around. It was pretty obvious tome that the medallion went around
faster than the wobbling. . .I had nothing to do, so I start ﬁguring out
the motion of the rotating plate. (Feynman and Leighton).
Feynman reached a point of frustration in his research
program and decided to deal with his inability to make scientiﬁc
progress by looking for opportunities to “play with physics.” In
solving the spin to wobble ratio of the plate he developed a
complex equation, which led to calculation of electron orbits and
breakthrough in his research program. Anecdotes like Feynman’s
may capture our imagination because, at ﬁrst glance, they seem
like the happy accident of good fortune. But, as Louis Pasteur
is often quoted, “Dans les champs de l’observation le hasard
ne favorise que les esprits préparés.” (Where observation is
concerned, chance favors only the prepared mind.) Feynman was
seeking aﬀordances to help him play with physics, shaped by a
general concern for his research program. Creative people may
talk about being lucky, but luck, it has been said, “is the residue
of design.”10 They become experts at perceiving the opportunities
10Attributed to Branch Rickey, also John Milton.
aﬀorded by their resource-rich environments as theymove within
and between them.
Theme 4: People actively scan their environments, and
seek out new environments, for opportunities to perceive
problems or ideas in new ways.
Settings Shape Perceiving-in-Action:
Creativity as Enactive Cognition
The foundational principle behind enactive cognition is that
perception and cognition depend upon a person’s interactions
with the world (Varela et al., 1991). People create their own
experiences through their actions; perceptions are shaped bywhat
they do, how they do it, and what they anticipate doing (Noë,
2004). Personal accounts describing embodied and embedded
experiences during creativity also ﬁt the enactive paradigm.
Evidence of embodied cognition was found in narratives about
intuitive processes during stages categorized as generating modes
of thinking when people think-in-action through activities
like writing, drawing, or model making. Embedded cognition
evidence was more typically found in stories of people explicitly
using epistemic actions during elaborating modes of creativity
when they change the context of a situation to perceive new
aﬀordances within a setting — such as through abstraction
with tools and materials or analogy using artifacts — or
by changing settings. The third mode of creative ideation,
incubating, is generally understood to involve sub-conscious (or
semi-conscious) mental processes, however, evidences suggests
it is sensitive to environmental conditions (Dijksterhuis and
Meurs, 2006; Sio and Ormerod, 2009; Leung et al., 2012). In this
section, the enactive perspective is discussed in terms of how it
may help shed light on relationships between diﬀerent modes of
creative ideation and the environmental conditions supporting
them.
Role of Physical Conditions in Complementary
Processes of Generating and Elaborating
People engage in complementary intuitive and explicit processes
when working on a creative problem; breakthrough emerges over
time, with incremental insights constituted by engagement with
tools, materials, and features of the architectural environment.
During ﬂow, creative practitioners often describe feeling part of
the product of their ideation (such as Berger’s drawing), however,
during elaboration modes their relationship to creative work
changes; it becomes an object of explicit and critical evaluation.
Aleksakova, an architect, describes how through intuitive and
dynamic process of perceiving and acting, she notices an
unexpected outcome of cutting, altering her relationship with the
product of creation; she no longer feels a part of it. The moment
of surprise triggers a process change from intuitive generating to
explicit elaborating.
You stop thinking,
You just look at the piece of foam and you try to make it beautiful,
You cut.
Sometimes you slice something,
And then another thing,
And ou-u-u-p-p-p something is there.
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And you think:
‘Oh, that’s interesting;’ it’s there. (Yaneva, 2009, p. 57)
During ﬂow (which she explains happens when “you stop
thinking”), knife and foam are transparent equipment allowing
Aleksakova to externalize thinking about a creative problem;
she describes actions and perceptions merging as an idea
takes shape from the process. Each action, guided by intuitive
response to a previous action, is in pursuit of the goal to
“make it beautiful.” When goal-directed expectations of an action
do not match perceived result of that action (“something is
there”) ﬂow processes break down and surprise triggers explicit
processes of elaboration (“you think: ‘oh, that’s interesting’. . .”).
The enactive perspective reveals how physical conditions in a
creative situation can curtail one mode of creativity and trigger
another.
Although people can choose to stop intuitively working
on a problem, and decide to critically consider the outcome
of their work, ﬁrst person accounts of creativity reveal how
movement between modes of creativity is often not a conscious
decision. This perspective is not evident in the creative stage
models, yet it has relevance for design strategies intended
to improve creative productivity. Complementary relationship
between modes of intuitive immersion and explicit elaboration
suggests that typical sequencing of creative stages (generating,
incubating, and elaborating) may not reﬂect the iterative ways
people transition between them. It also helps highlight diﬀerences
in environmental conditions supporting each of themodes— and
implications this might have for workplace designs.
Theme 5: People’s perceptions of aﬀordances in their
environments depend (in part) on their activities and mode
of creative thinking.
Integration of the embodied, embedded, and enactive
perspectives with respect to creative cognition reveals overlaps
and disparities between person–environment relationships
among diﬀerent modes of ideation (see Table 2). Essential to
the intuitive immersion of creative ﬂow is tools and materials
functioning as transparent equipment. Tools and materials may
also be embodied during explicit elaboration, however, this is
not critical, as it seems to be for ﬂow. Failure of a tool (i.e.,
when a nib breaks) or unexpected outcome of working with
a material (i.e., when cutting foam transforms the material in
unanticipated ways) will often engender the elaboration mode.
During elaboration modes tools and materials may be critically
regarded as things to think with. (For example, a musician
may pick up an unfamiliar instrument to explore an idea for a
composition.) Settings for intuitive ﬂow must protect the creative
practitioner from interruption or distraction11 and support the
focused attention required through familiar and comfortable
tools, furnishings, and environs. These conditions are not
critical for elaboration, which instead beneﬁts from unfamiliar
environments and resources, helping the creative practitioner
perceive an idea or product in new ways. How people perceive
their environment is, in part, determined by their mode of
creative thinking and, in turn, their mode of thinking may be
inﬂuenced by conditions in their physical environment.
Autopoiesis, Niche Construction, and Creative
Ideation
Central to the enactive thesis is a systems approach to
understanding human cognition. As developed by Varela et al.
(1991) its core concepts are inﬂuenced by autopoiesis (Varela
et al., 1974), considering living organisms as “autonomous
systems” who “regulate their interactions with the world in
such a way that they transform the world into a place of
salience, meaning, and value” (Thompson and Stapleton, 2009,
11Importance exempliﬁed by Coleridge’s (1816, pp 50–57) famous account of
interruption while composing Kubla Khan.
TABLE 2 | The 3E’s and modes of creative ideation: summary of themes.
3E Theories Generating Elaborating Incubating
Intuitive immersion in creative flow Explicit evaluation and exploration of an idea Semi-conscious rumination about an idea
Embodied Theme 1: Tools and materials are ‘transparent
equipment’ when people see through them to the
task at hand, extending sense of the body.
Tools and materials may be embodied, but
this is not critical to the process.
Tools and materials are likely embodied when
working on mundane tasks unrelated to the
creative problem
Theme 2: People incorporate features and
sensory attributes of settings into ritualistic
behaviors to psychologically prepare for creative
efforts, integrating them into concept of creative
self over time.
People describe rituals (like walking or riding a
train) and favorite settings with similar sensory
qualities to help them incubate; they do not,
however, express integration of these places
into concept of creative self.
Embedded Seeing with materials sustains complementary
processes of acting and perceiving through
continuous reciprocal causation.
Theme 3: People see with tools and
materials and see as objects and features of
their environment to understand complex
problems and creative situations in new ways.
Theme 4: People actively scan their
environments, and seek out new
environments, for opportunities to perceive
different affordances in problems or ideas.
Environmental cues positively influence insight
during incubation.
Enactive Theme 5: People’s perceptions of affordances in their environments depend (in part) on their activities and mode of creative thinking.
Theme 6: People change conditions in their environments, or move to new environments, to help them transition between creative modes of ideation.
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p. 25). By “transforming the world” people create their own
“milieu” (i.e., cognitive niche). Cognition, from the enactive
perspective, is structural coupling between brain, body, and
world; “it is the relational process of sense-making that takes
place between the system and its environment” (Thompson and
Stapleton, 2009, p. 26). Stories reviewed in this paper, organized
by common mode of creative thinking and theories of physically
situated cognition, begin to reveal how creative practitioners
exploit, transform, and move between settings, constructing
cognitive niches to engender, sustain, and enhance diﬀerent
modes of creativity. Creative practitioners describe choosing
similar types of places where they feel most creative and vote
with their feet when creativity wanes by seeking out new places
to work.
People quickly identify places that are not conducive to
creativity and will change settings to keep creative productivity
high (Buttimer, 1983). Kipling (1937) describes how his creative
“Daemon would not function in brickyards” so he “walked the
other way.”
I wrote a tale . . . in a brickyard. . .. It turned out a painstaken
and meritorious piece of work, overloaded with veriﬁed references,
with about as much feeling to it as a walking-stick. . .. Evidently
my Daemon would not function in brickyards or schoolrooms.
Therefore, like Alice inWonderland, I turned my back on the whole
thing and walked the other way.
People periodically change environments (by moving to a new
place or by reconﬁguring an existing space), leading Buttimer
(1983, p. 59) to suggest “creative work demands quiet and
privacy, but also needs movement and a sense of change. . .”.
The latter seems to particularly be the case when people have
reached a point of frustration on a creative problem. The famous
saying that creativity happens in the bed, bus, and bath (Dart,
1989) was inspired by some of the most compelling stories of
creativity describing a moment of insight — coming (seemingly)
from out of the blue (such as Nikola Tesla’s idea for alternating
current, which came to him during a walk), during a dream-
like state (like Kekulé’s insight into the ring-like structure of
benzene while dozing in front of the ﬁre), or when engaged in
an unrelated activity (such as the famous myth of Archimedes’s
“eureka” moment during a bath). Wallas (1926) coined the
term incubation to describe this stage of creativity. Although
the incubative process is not well understood, it is believed
an instrumental part of ideation and thus warrants discussion
here.
Incubation occurs when conscious work on a problem ceases,
particularly during period of indecision (Cohen and Ferrari,
2010). Studies ﬁnd insight improved when people work on
unrelated mundane (low-cognitive load) tasks during incubation
(Dijksterhuis and Meurs, 2006; Sio and Ormerod, 2009) or
when environmental cues are encountered immediately before
or during incubation (Sio and Ormerod, 2009). Incubation may
involve embodied tools or materials when a creative practitioner
uses them to engage in unrelated work, but this does not
seem a necessary condition. It may be a form of embedded
cognition when people have creative breakthroughs in response
to environmental cues. Stories where people incorporated cues
from their setting to yield insight (such as Farnsworth’s) suggest
elaboration and incubation may be related modes of critical
reﬂection during creativity – one involving explicit cognitive
processes and the other sub-conscious (or semi-conscious)
reﬂection on a creative problem or idea. A striking theme among
personal and biographical accounts of creativity is similarity of
settings and activities where people experienced creative insight
during incubation.
Incubation stories overwhelmingly describe insight happening
while walking or riding a bus, carriage or train. Von Helmholtz
claimed incubation did not occur when he was tired or while
at his worktable, but walking outside encouraged it (Wallas,
1926, p. 80). Poincaré (1954, p. 26) also described insight
occurring during incubation when he took a break from work
and went for a walk, rode the bus, or when involved in unrelated
activities while serving in the military. The train is identiﬁed
as a productive workplace in both Buttimer’s (1983) report on
45 creatives from diverse disciplines and in Törnqvist’s (2004)
analysis of biographies written about Nobel Laureates. They
are so often referenced in personal accounts that Harding and
Nichols (1948) suggest the rhythm of transportation modes may
induce in creative practitioners a hypnotic state conducive to
ideation. Whether motion, background noise [as suggested by
Mehta et al.’s (2012) study mentioned previously], or other
environmental qualities, people seek out similar sense-giving
spaces to invite incubation. Thus incubation may be aﬀected by
environmental conditions under which it takes place, however,
these examples do not obviously ﬁt the enactive paradigm
described by Varela et al. (1991).
Anecdotes suggest settings may play a role in encouraging
or sustaining incubation; given limited knowledge of the
mechanisms behind the intuitive process, there is not enough
evidence to determine if it may be a form of enactive cognition.
For alternative explanation, Clark (1999) argues complex
“representation-hungry” problems requiring abstraction or
imagination may involve “oﬀ-line reasoning” (in other words,
mental representation, which is antithetical to the enactive
thesis). Ward et al. (2011, p. 375) suggests it is not “bodily activity
itself but our practical knowledge (which need not be verbalized
or in any way explicit) of our own possibilities for action” that
constitutes understanding. In contrast, Bergen’s (2012) embodied
simulation hypothesis proposes people do not rely on mental
representations during oﬀ-line thinking, rather they imagine
virtual experiences; abstract thinking may be grounded in action
throughmetaphor (Lakoﬀ and Johnson, 1980). Even if incubation
does involve “oﬀ-line reasoning,” stories of creativity suggest
certain environmental conditions might inhibit the process (such
as by demanding too much attention) or provide qualities that
people ﬁnd support their ability to incubate (such as spatial
conﬁgurations that invite walking)12.
Theme 6: People change conditions in their environments,
or move to new environments, to help them transition
between creative modes of ideation.
12For example, experimental studies by Leung et al. (2012) suggest spatial
conﬁgurations and ways people move through them inﬂuences quality and
quantity of ideas generated.
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TOWARD AN ECOLOGICAL MODEL OF
CREATIVITY
Analysis of ﬁrst person and biographical accounts reveals several
things of potential relevance to the design of settings to support
creativity. First, there is evidence that creative processes are
embodied and embedded in, and enacted by architectural
settings. This suggests architectural designs have the potential
to positively or negatively impact user creativity. Second, themes
from 3E analysis, organized with respect to the creative modes
in Table 2, illustrate how a single mode of creativity may
involve multiple forms of physically situated cognition (e.g., the
elaboration mode may be embodied, embedded, and enactive).
Although it is useful from the perspective of analysis to separate
the 3E’s, in reality they are often integrated during creativity
in the world. Development of a theoretical framework to guide
design strategies must account for this. Third, how people perceive
features and attributes of their environments is shaped by their
mode of creative thinking. Thus how and why people use settings
must be examinedwith respect to eachmode of creativity. Fourth,
people change their environments to help them transition between
modes of creativity. The analysis in the paper reveals how creative
modes may be supported by diﬀerent environmental conditions.
This suggests the environments which support one mode of
creativity may inhibit another. For example, workplaces designed
to maximize impromptu social interaction may be eﬀective for
elaborating modes, but at the cost of inhibiting (or at least
harming) generating modes. Finally, it should be noted that it is
beyond the scope of this paper to theorize whether all creative
process are physically situated or if some processes (such as
incubation) are always physically situated, however, evidence
gathered thus far suggests dynamic relationships between person
and environment are instrumental for creative practitioners
during modes of creative ideation.
Linking Process and Place
The aim of analyzing creative processes through the lens of the
3E’s was to look for evidence of physical situatedness as a ﬁrst step
toward developing a theoretical framework useful for informing
architectural design strategies. The remainder of this section
describes how ﬁndings from the analysis are used toward this
goal. First themes from analysis inform three propositions about
person–environment relationships during creativity as follows:
Proposition 1
Creative cognition is embodied when people see through tools
and materials while intuitively perceiving-in-action, deepening
immersion in the creative process and extending sense of the
body during creativity.
Proposition 2
Creative cognition is embedded when people see with or see
as tools, materials, decorative objects, or other features of
their settings as things to think with, thereby extending their
capabilities to understand a complex problem.
Proposition 3
Creative cognition is enacted when people construct cognitive
niches for creativity by interacting with, altering, and moving
between settings to engender, sustain, and enhance diﬀerent
modes of creative thinking.
Second, modes of creative ideation are linked with
environmental conditions (Figure 3). As mentioned in the
beginning of this paper, (a) there has been little integration
FIGURE 3 | Linking creative process and place.
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between creative process and press research streams, (b)
press research has focused primarily on the social context of
creativity, and (c) stage models describe purely mental processes
with little incorporation of physically situated theories of
cognition. Existing stage models of creativity are not useful
for informing architectural design strategies because they
neither adequately identify and describe physical activities
involved in the sub-processes of creativity nor suﬃciently
explain the relationships between creative stages or how people
move between them. Figure 3 illustrates through a conceptual
diagram those process–place relationships described by creative
practitioners as they engaged in modes of creative ideation. The
diagram highlights how each mode is supported by diﬀerent
environmental conditions. (A few key setting qualities are
provided to illustrate this point.) It also describes relationships
between ideation modes. Although people may consciously
choose to move between modes, analysis reveals how perceived
outcomes of physically situated cognitive processes can curtail
or engender modes. This diagram illustrates what creative
practitioners have described in these situations. For example,
the generating mode of intuitive immersion is curtailed by an
unexpected outcome (e.g., Aleksakova’s surprise after cutting
the foam) and this triggers the elaborating mode to explicitly
explore and evaluate the surprising situation. If the creative
practitioner is unable to garner new insight into the situation
through exploration and evaluation, frustration may curtail
the elaborating mode and trigger incubation (e.g., as Feynman
described deciding to walk away from his research and ‘play’ with
physics). During incubation the creative practitioner continues
to work sub-consciously or semi-consciously on the problem
until moment of insight. Insight engenders the elaborating mode
to determine its merit and, if suitable, is used to inform a new
plan or goal from which to initiate the generating mode. Poincaré
(1954) describes this iterative process of moving between modes
of generating, evaluating, and incubating as he worked to solve a
mathematical problem.
Finally, drawing on compatibilities between enactive
cognition and Gibson’s aﬀordance theory from ecological
psychology, and informed by the three propositions and
process–place diagram (Figure 3), a preliminary framework
for a dynamical systems model (Figure 4) illustrates person–
environment interactions during creative ideation. Central to an
ecological model of creativity is the transactional relationship
between person and setting during creativity; people construct
cognitive niches for creative modes through their actions
within spaces, with artifacts and features of their setting, and
by moving from one space to another. This framework intends
to provide a starting point for organizing existing research and
informing new studies to better understand the relationships
between architectural design strategies and user creativity toward
developing an ecological model of creativity.
Niche construction is a concept borrowed from evolutionary
biology and ecology describing how organisms change
environmental conditions to increase their chances of survival
(O’Brien and Laland, 2012); they adapt to problematic conditions
in their environment through modiﬁcations they make to it.
In cognitive science the concept is commonly used to describe
how people oﬀ-load mental work to their environments (e.g.,
FIGURE 4 | Framework for an ecological model of creativity.
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through epistemic actions, externalizing ideas through model
making or diagramming, etc.) to extend cognitive capabilities
(Clark, 2008a). The framework presented here merges the
ecological and cognitive perspectives to better understand (1)
how architectural designs impact users’ creative processes and (2)
how users exploit, alter, and move between settings to increase
creative productivity. It begins to deﬁne variables involved
in creative niche construction: (1) factors in the architectural
setting and their sense-giving qualities, (2) characteristics of
the creative person and his/her mode of creative ideation, (3)
aﬀordances (i.e., opportunities for action) oﬀered by qualities
of the architectural setting with respect to the creative person
and mode of ideation, and (4) actions of the creative person that
change the architectural setting, thereby impacting aﬀordances
oﬀered.
Architectural setting
An architectural design is an example of niche construction
in the biological sense; a building protects inhabitants from
extreme weather and other safety risks, provides comfort through
furnishings, equipment to prepare and serve food, a place to
bathe, etc. It is a milieu, exerting environmental pressures on
users through spatial conﬁgurations and sense-giving qualities.
Areas of concern for architectural design professionals deﬁne the
diﬀerent variables of the architectural setting in this framework.
For example, designs to support the generating mode could be
considered from the perspective of site (e.g., the site for the
Salk Institute is in a low density, quiet area, and on a cliﬀ
overlooking the ocean), buildings, (e.g., Kahn oriented buildings
to maximize views toward the ocean), rooms (e.g., he angled
scientists oﬃces to provide a window in each, framing the
inspirational view), and so forth. People also exert pressures
on the architectural settings they use (Brand, 1994); building
and user engage in an ongoing reciprocal relationship. For
example, Kahn expected users would reconﬁgure the laboratory
spaces at the Salk Institute and designed them to facilitate
ﬂexible spatial conﬁgurations. However, users have constructed
private oﬃces in these buildings, a pressure on the space
he did not anticipate. This framework could be used to
examine user rationale for the changes they make in and to
their settings and how these changes, in turn, impact creative
processes. Architectural settings inspire and constrain behavior
and cognition through the aﬀordances they oﬀer, and users, by
actualizing aﬀordances, change conditions in their environments
thereby shaping aﬀordances available to them.
Affordances
This framework describes aﬀordances as relationships between
sense-giving qualities of an architectural setting with respect
to the personal skills and abilities of its user, providing
opportunities for creative thinking-in-action. Aﬀordances may
invite behaviors (e.g., through spatial conﬁgurations encouraging
social interaction) or aesthetic appreciation (e.g., through forms
and materials). During creativity, room ﬁnishes or features aﬀord
protection from unwanted distraction (such as Proust’s cork-
lined walls) or inspirational views (like Kant’s of the church
tower). Decorative objects (for example, those on Kipling’s desk)
aﬀord rituals initiating creative eﬀorts, and familiar tools aﬀord
perceiving-in-action during ﬂow. Aﬀordances exist whether or
not they are perceived or actualized (used). For example, a twig
dipped in ink aﬀords writing, even if not perceived as such.
Conversely, a pen with a broken nib does not aﬀord writing.
Creative practitioner
Creative people have unique expertise13 (including domain
knowledge and personal experiences) and psychomotor
abilities, which, in part, determine aﬀordances oﬀered by their
environments and how these are perceived and actualized. For
example, a musician perceives a conch shell aﬀords playing
and he actualizes that aﬀordance when he sees through it in
the process of composing music. A writer perceives the shell as
something she collected as a child during walks with her mother
and actualizes the aﬀordance when she sees with it, evoking
memories she documents in her story. An architect perceives
the shell as an enclosure and actualizes the aﬀordance when
he sees as it to design the form of a new building. Seeing, used
ﬁguratively in the model, refers to all ways of perceiving (not
exclusively visual), consciously and subconsciously, through
the sensorimotor system. Aﬀordances depend upon a person’s
goal or intention toward, or concern about, a creative situation,
framed by the mode of creative thinking.
Actions
Finally, the model describes how people make sense of complex
and ill-deﬁned problems through their actions, which alter
aﬀordances perceived and actualized in the situation. People have
autonomy (Thompson and Stapleton, 2009), or agency (Gibson,
1977; Reed, 1996), to seek out environments (like trains) that
help them be creative, develop behaviors to ﬁt their environment
(such as ritualistic cleaning of work surfaces, setting out favorite
tools, gazing at an inspirational view) and alter environments
to suit their needs (to address ‘poor ﬁt’ such as when Kant
had his neighbor’s tree cut down after it blocked his tower
view, or through personalization to inspire creativity such as the
meaningful objects on Kipling’s desk.)
An example
Feynman’s story of the spinning plate illustrates how the
framework might be used to guide understanding and empirical
examination of physically situated processes involved in
creativity. He, as a creative practitioner, has domain expertise
in physics. In a period of frustration, he stops working on
his research problem and decides to ‘play’ with physics. He
walks around the Cornell University campus (changing his
environment by moving to a new setting) with an intention to
play with physics. When he arrives in the cafeteria he perceives
a plate tossed into the air by a student. Because of his domain
expertise, he notes the rate at which it spins and wobbles are
diﬀerent. He perceives this as an opportunity to play with physics
by ﬁguring out the ratio. Signiﬁcantly, he perceives the plate’s
aﬀordance while he is in incubating mode, which was engendered
when he stopped working on his research. Although the plate
13For example, research suggests people’s visual perception changes as they develop
expertise in a domain.
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might seem a new creative problem to pursue, it is a process
through which he gains insight on his research program. He
sees with the plate to develop a new perspective on his creative
problem. Working out the ratio, he devises a plan allowing him
to resume productive work on his research, eventually leading to
a breakthrough and the Nobel Prize.
Stage models of creativity do not capture the iterative,
physically situated nature of incremental breakthroughs on a
creative problem that creative practitioners describe. Stories
like Feynman’s, Poincaré’s, and others help to reveal the
dynamical relationship between person and environment during
creativity. Gibson’s aﬀordance theory of visual perception
provides a foundation upon which to develop understanding
of this relationship. However, to empirically examine the
creative process as a form of physically situated cognition,
it must be extended to include key personal characteristics
and environmental factors impacting creative processes and
outcomes. The framework proposed in this paper aims to provide
a ﬁrst step toward that goal. By linking process, and place, it
may provide a useful structure to bridge research in creativity,
cognitive science, and architectural design toward developing an
ecological model of creative processes.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Analysis presented in this paper was limited to examination of
existing ﬁrst-person and biographical accounts of creativity by
creative practitioners and therefore excluded perspectives from
creative practitioners who were not compelled to write about
their processes. It is possible those who write about creativity
may not adequately represent the entire creative practitioner
population. Most narratives were written by people who had quite
a bit of freedom to work where, when, and how they wished.
This provided a wealth of data, but does not represent the typical
corporate oﬃce employee.14 There are more personal accounts
by authors, than, for example, musicians. Authors may be more
inclined to write personal accounts or some creative practitioners
may feel they have less to write about; there may be people who
believe their creative processes are not dependent upon physical
conditions and thus are not compelled to write about them.
Although eﬀorts were made to include a diversity of creative
perspectives (e.g., from the arts, design, humanities, math, and
science) not every creative ﬁeld is represented in this analysis.
This paper also aimed to identify domain general (independent)15
modes of creativity, thus disciplinary and individual process
diﬀerences are not considered. Finally, it focused solely on
narratives about ideation modes of the creative process; it did not
consider other stages of creativity that might also be physically
situated (such as problem ﬁnding or implementation).
14Because oﬃce worker behavior is tightly governed by organizational culture, this
population would not have been useful for the purposes of understanding how
creative processes might be physically situated.
15Scientists debate whether creativity is domain-general or domain-speciﬁc, with
perspectives inﬂuenced by research approaches (Silvia et al., 2009); examination of
creative products typically involves domain-speciﬁc research whereas person and
process research is concerned with identifying domain-general traits and stages.
Much more research is needed (and from multidisciplinary
perspectives) to better understand how physical contexts
impact — and ways architectural designs might support —
human creativity. As a small step toward a rather lofty goal,
this paper attempts to provide some evidence of how creativity
is physically situated in architectural settings. It does so by
(1) identifying common (domain-general) modes of creative
thinking, (2) organizing ﬁrst person and biographical accounts
describing the things creative people do when engaged in these
creative modes, (3) analyzing these through the lens of situated
cognition with the embodied, embedded and enactive cognition
theses, and (4) illustrating person-environment relationships they
describe in a theoretical framework integrating complementary
concepts from enactive cognition and ecological psychology.
Next steps in this research program include:
(1) Extending the framework to include problem-ﬁnding and
implementing modes, through:
(a) Analysis of ﬁrst-person and biographical accounts, to
identify other physically situated processes.
(b) Testing explanatory power against documented impacts
of architectural designs on creative productivity.
(c) Testing predictive power through case and quasi-
experimental studies of creative practitioners in
workplace settings (pre- and post-occupancy).
(2) Identifying additional environmental mechanisms relevant
to understanding potential impacts of architectural design
strategies including:
(a) Other environmental factors involved in engendering,
sustaining, and/or inhibiting modes of creativity and
relationships between them.
(b) Design variables in architectural settings with respect to
modes of creativity.
(c) Organizational factors impacting how people use settings.
(3) Develop a dynamic systems model integrating person,
cognitive, social and physical factors
(a) Including separating domain-general, domain-speciﬁc,
and subject/personal processes involved in physically
situated processes.
CONCLUSION
Anecdotes about creativity suggest people’s processes involve
embodied, embedded, and enactive forms of cognition, with the
intertwined nature of thinking and acting a common theme.
The physical context of creativity, including architectural settings
where people work, remains largely unexamined — in part
because of the complexity involved in empirically studying it.
Economic pressure on companies to capitalize not only on
employee creative productivity by also on every square foot of
ﬂoor space reveals the untapped potential of architectural designs
to add creative value to organizations (De Paoli et al., 2013).
Yet there is no theoretical framework appropriate for guiding
design decisions or predicting post-occupancy impacts in spaces
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 16 January 2016 | Volume 6 | Article 1978
Malinin Toward an Ecological Creativity Model
to support creativity. Roughly 30 years ago, Gibson (1976, p. 413)
complained “architecture and design do not have a satisfactory
theoretical basis” and many in the profession feel this statement
holds true today (Hensel et al., 2009; Lang and Moleski, 2010).
Complementary concepts from Gibson’s theory of aﬀordances
and the enactive thesis of human cognition may together begin to
provide the framework for a functional theory linking cognition,
behavior, and environmental design. The model proposed in this
paper suggests the beneﬁts such an integrative approach could
have for architects and creativity researchers in guiding future
scientiﬁc research and design practices.
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